A mix network achieving strong correctness and privacy is proposed. The degree of correctness and privacy are precisely stated and a formal proof of correctness is given. A grouping function is employed to achieve stronger correctness and higher efficiency without compromising strong privacy. In order to further improve the efficiency of the mix network a new batch verification technique, suitable for verifying multiple proofs of knowledge, is presented together with a formal proof of soundness.
Introduction
Mix networks are important tools to implement anonymity and are widely employed in many cryptographic applications such as e-voting and e-auctions. Since the original proposal of Chaum [6] many mix networks have been proposed in the research literature. However, most of them are inefficient, vulnerable, or limited to some special applications. Abe [1] introduced the idea of improving efficiency by dividing a costly large-scale verification operation into a few efficient smallscale verification operations. In this paper, we use Abe's idea in a new way to design a mix network with several novel features and avoiding some shortcomings of Abe's scheme. Our final proposal is simpler and more efficient than Abe's mix network, and also more efficient than other mix networks employing verification of shuffling on each server (e.g. [8, 14, 10] ), especially when a large number of values are shuffled. Unlike other schemes, the new proposal achieves correctness and privacy more clearly and precisely. Therefore, our scheme is more suitable for many applications.
We divide the explanation of the new mix network into three stages. First a prototype Mix-1 is proposed, which employs a new verification mechanism to achieve formally proved correctness. Then Mix-1 is optimised to Mix-2 by adopting a grouping function. Compared to Mix-1, Mix-2 improves efficiency, strengthens correctness, and maintains strong privacy. Finally, a formally proved batch verification technique is applied to optimize Mix-2 to Mix-3, the final protocol achieving even higher efficiency.
Related Work
A mix network shuffles a number of ciphertext inputs, each from one user, to the same number of plaintext outputs, so that 1) the outputs are a permutation of the plaintexts of the inputs; 2) the permutation between the inputs and the outputs is unknown, so that the users cannot be linked to their outputs. These two properties are called correctness and privacy. A mix network achieves robustness if it can still work properly in abnormal situations, such as failure of one or more switching nodes. A mix network is publicly verifiable if its correctness can be publicly verified. A mix network is usually composed of a few servers, working in sequence. Each server gets its inputs from the previous server and randomly permutes them to a set of outputs, which are inputs to the next server.
According to the processing performed by the servers, mix networks can be classified into two types: decryption chain mix networks and re-encryption mix networks. In the former type each input is sequentially encrypted for each server by the user. Consequently failure of any server means that the input message cannot be recovered if each server keeps his private key secret as required to achieve strong privacy. Therefore decryption chain mix networks inherently lack robustness. Only re-encryption mix networks are discussed further in this paper.
Ogata et al. [15] , introduced a basic structure for re-encryption mix networks, which was further developed in many later papers. Suppose ElGamal encryption scheme is employed with private key x and public key (g, y = g x ). Several decrypting authorities share x by t-out-of-m threshold verifiable secret sharing. The m servers SV j for j = 1, 2, . . . , m form a mix network to shuffle n encrypted inputs c i for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Inputs to SV j are c j−1,i for i = 1, 2, . . . , n while c 0,i = c i for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Outputs of SV j are c j,
where r j,i is randomly chosen and π j is a secret random permutation of {1, 2, . . . , n}. The outputs of the mix network are c i = c m,i for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. The shuffling from n inputs to n outputs on every server is denoted as P N(n), correctness of which must be verified. Finally, the decrypting authorities (e.g. the servers themselves) cooperate to decrypt c i for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Mix networks can be further classified into three categories according to the different correctness verification mechanisms.
-In the first category, correctness is not verified and the servers are trusted to perform the shuffling correctly. Ohkubo and Abe [16] designed an example in this category. Strong trust is necessary in such a mix network. -Mix networks in the second category do not provide a verification of correct shuffling by each server separately. Instead, correctness of the shuffling by the whole mix network is verified after the mix network outputs the shuffled results in plaintexts. Several published schemes fall into this category [6, 17, 19, 9] . Drawbacks of this category include 1) a cheating server cannot be identified instantly; 2) in case of verification of incorrect shuffling, a mix network in the third category must be employed to perform the shuffling again; 3) some outputs may be revealed in plaintext even when the shuffling is incorrect and a re-shuffling is needed. -In the third category [18, 13, 1, 2, 8, 15, 12, 4, 14, 10] each server verifies correctness of the previous servers' shuffling before performing its own shuffling and proves that its own shuffling is correct before sending them to the next server. Although the schemes in the first two categories are more efficient, the third category is still very useful because 1. it overcomes the shortcomings of the first two categories; 2. it is a necessary sub-function (to deal with the abnormal situation when cheating in the shuffling is found) in the second category. However, in this category, various problems exist: [13] is not publicly verifiable; the guarantee for correctness and privacy is not strong enough for many applications [12, 4] ; [1, 2, 15, 18] are inefficient. Among them, three recently proposed schemes [8, 14, 10] are best. However, these three schemes are still not efficient enough for large-scale applications (e.g. national voting) as their computational cost is linear to the number of inputs.
In the third category, Abe's scheme [1] has a particularly useful feature which is an efficiency improvement on the following naive mix network. Let π j,l for l = 1, 2, . . . , n! be all the n! possible permutations for π j . A naive method to verify correctness of shuffling by SV j is to test the following equation.
This verification allows correctness to be proved without breaching privacy. Zero knowledge proof of 1-out-of-n! equality of logarithms can be applied to implement (1), based on the zero knowledge proof of partial knowledge by Cramer et al [7] . This test is very inefficient because the computational cost for both the prover and verifier on every server is O(n · n!) exponentiations. So Abe improved its efficiency by dividing a n-input-to-n-output mixing (denoted as P N(n) in [1] ) into a few 2-input-to-2-output mixing (denoted as P N(2) in [1] ). However, Abe's schemes are still not efficent enough for many applications. Our proposal is to design a re-encryption mix network employing correctness verification per server. The new scheme overcomes the shortcomings of Abe's schemes [1, 2] , while retaining the idea that efficiency can be saved by dividing a large-scale correctness verification into several small-scale correctness verifications. It achieves higher computational efficiency than that of [8, 14, 10] in that the computational cost is independent of the number of users, but determined by the extent of correctness and privacy required by a certain application.
Preliminary Work
In this section we introduce the building blocks used to construct our mix network. We first propose a new method for shuffling verification in a mix network and prove that it is sufficient to guarantee validity of the shuffling. Then we present a new batch verification technology to improve efficiency of simultaneous proofs of equality of logarithms, which appear in the verification of the shuffling.
Improvement on the Naive Verification Technique
Although naive verification by Equation (1) can explicitly guarantee the correctness of SV j 's shuffling, it is too inefficient to be practical. A more efficient verification technique uses the following equation.
Equation (2) must be proved with zero knowledge proof of 1-out-of-n equality of logarithms. The computational cost of proof and verification of this equation is n(4n − 2) and 4n 2 exponentiations respectively. The zero knowledge proof of Equation (2) by SV j is denoted by CV (correctness verification) in the rest of this paper.
It is proved in Theorem 1 that CV is enough for the correctness verification.
Theorem 1.
If the shuffling by SV j is incorrect, CV can be satisfied with a probability no more than 1/q without collusion of all the previous j − 1 servers and at least two users, assuming DL problem is intractable.
To prove Theorem 1, the following lemma is used.
Lemma 1. If the shuffling by SV j is incorrect and for every
Proof: If the shuffling is incorrect and for every c j−1,µ for µ = 1, 2, . . . , n, there exists a c j,ν with 1
Otherwise there exists a permutation P M between the inputs and outputs such that c j,
which is contradictory to the assumption that the shuffling is incorrect.
Proof of Theorem 1:
As SV j cannot get collusion of all the previous j − 1 servers and at least two users, the inputs to SV j are encrypted randomly from the viewpoint of SV j and SV j knows log g a j−1,i for at most one
. . , n. Otherwise according to Lemma 1 SV j knows log g a j−1,i −log g a j−1,i where 1 ≤ i < i ≤ n, which is contradictory to the above assumption. So
can be proved in CV with a probability no more than 1/q as proof of equality of logarithms in CV implies knowledge of logarithm (without knowledge of the logarithm, SV j can only guess the challenge and the success probability of the guess is 1/q).
Therefore, CV can be satisfied with a probability no more than 1/q. 2
Even when SV j colludes with all previous j − 1 servers and at least two users, invalid shuffling of the honest users' inputs will still be discovered in CV with an overwhelmingly large probability. This conclusion is straightforward from the proof of Lemma 1. In proof of Lemma 1, it is illustrated that the only possible attack against correctness is for a malicious server to collude with two or more malicious users and all the previous servers to tamper any of these malicious users' inputs. Since an honest user will not conspire with the malicious server and will conceal the randomising factor in his encrypted input, the attack against the integrity of his input can only succeed with a negligible probability if DL is intractable. Due to space limitations, this conclusion is not proved in detail.
Batch Verification of Equality of Logarithms
A theorem for batch verification is presented in this section, which extends known batch techniques [3, 5, 11] . This technique can batch verify equality of logarithms and optimize efficiency of the verification protocol in Section 3.1. Batch verification of equality of logarithms was first mentioned in a voting scheme [18] . However, in [18] , batch verification is not formally proposed or proved to be secure.
The formal description of batch verification of equality of logarithms is provided in Theorem 2, which will be formally proved.
Definition 2 | | is the absolute-value function from
Z * p to G defined by |σ| = σ if σ ∈ G −σ if σ ∈ Z * p \ G Theorem 2. Suppose y i ∈ Z * p and z i ∈ Z * p for i = 1, 2, . . . ,
n. Let l be a security parameter and t i satisfying
To prove Theorem 2, a lemma is proved first. 
Lemma 2. Suppose y
i ∈ Z * p and z i ∈ Z * p for i = 1, 2, . . . , n and t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t v−1 , t v+1 , t v+2 , . . . , t n are constant. If log g |y v | = log h |z v | with 1 ≤ v ≤ n and log g n i=1 y ti i = log h n i=1 z ti i ,| = log h |z v |, t 1 , t 2 , . . . and t v =t v . log g n i=1 y ti i = log h n i=1 z ti i (3) log g v−1 i=1 y ti i · yt v v n i=v+1 y ti i = log h v−1 i=1 z ti i · zt v v n i=v+1 z ti i (4)(t v −t v ) log g y v = (t v −t v ) log h z v mod q. Note that t v −t v = 0 mod q because 1 ≤t v < t v < 2 l < q. Therefore, log g y v = log h z v mod q 2. y v or z v ∈ Z * p \G. Then t v −t v mustfor i = 1, 2, . . . , n, at most (2 l ) n−1 of them can satisfy log g n i=1 y ti i = log h n i=1 z ti i when log g |y v | = log h |z v |. So if log g |y v | = log h |z v | and t i for i = 1, 2, . . . , n are randomly chosen, log g n i=1 y ti i = log h n i=1 z ti iis satisfied with probability no more than 2 −l . 2
The Proposed Mix Network
When the server SV j performs ElGamal re-encryption and permutation π j and Equation (2) is employed to verify the correctness of shuffling, the following properties are achieved.
1. A dishonest server SV j can prove its incorrect shuffling to be correct with probability no more than 1/q without collusion of all the previous j − 1 servers and at least two users. Even when SV j colludes with all the previous j − 1 servers and at least two users, invalid shuffling of honest users' inputs will still be discovered in CV with an overwhelmingly large probability. 2. Identified incorrect shuffling can be removed and the mix network can recover efficiently. 3. Computational costs for the prover and verifier of the correctness verification of a server's shuffling are n(4n − 2) and 4n 2 exponentiations respectively. 4. If at least one server is honest, all the n! permutation are equally possible in the mix network and if the number of malicious decrypting authorities is no more than t, privacy is achieved.
This mix network is denoted as Mix-1. However there are still some drawbacks of this solution:
-when two users conspire with the first server, correctness is not guaranteed; -when n is large, O(n 2 ) exponentiations is still a high cost.
To solve these problems, an idea of Abe [1, 2] is used: divide a P N(n) into a few smaller shufflings, verification of whose correctness is efficient. However, switching gate P N(2) is not applied in this paper to avoid complex construction of gate circuit. Instead, a simpler grouping technique is used.
Group Shuffling
On each server the n inputs are divided into groups with same size k, while reencryption and random permutation are applied to each group. For simplicity, suppose n = k u . There are z = k u−1 groups. Usually m ≤ u as the number of servers is often small. The grouping function on every server is specially designed according to a general rule: if an input to the mix network is likely to be permuted to a few outputs after the shuffling of the first j servers, any two of these outputs (inputs to the j + 1 th server) cannot be divided into a same group on the j + 1 th server. This rule can provide the greatest diffusion, and thus as strong privacy as possible. Before the shuffling, each server SV j randomly generates v j,i ∈ G for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Inputs to the mix network c i for i = 1, 2, . . . , n are sorted to c 0,i = (a 0,i , b 0,i ) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, so that a 0,i + m j=1 v j,i mod p increases as i increases. On server SV j , the shuffling is as follows.
-SV j regroups in every k successive shuffling ranges. The k inputs in the same position in every k successive shuffling ranges are regrouped into the same group. Namely, input c j−1,i is mapped to c j,α,β , which is the β th element in Group α, where α = ( Shuffling of SV j is verified by SV j+1 before it starts its own shuffling using the following equation.
for α = 1, 2, . . . , z and β = 1, 2, . . . , k
Realization of verification of Equation (5) is denoted as GCV (grouped correctness verification).
If the verification fails, SV j+1 gets the outputs of SV j−1 , verifies them and uses them as its inputs if they are valid. If SV j−1 's outputs are invalid too, he gets the outputs of the previous server until he finds a set of valid outputs as its inputs. After the shuffling of the last server, the outputs are decrypted as in Mix-1. This mix network applying group shuffling is denoted as Mix-2.
The following theorem can be proved in a way similar to the proof of theorem 1.
Theorem 3. If the group shuffling by SV j is incorrect, GCV can be satisfied with a probability no more than 1/q without collusion of all the previous j − 1 servers and at least two users in a same group on SV j , assuming DL problem is intractable.
When conspiracy of all the previous servers and at least two malicious users is available, attack against correctness is more difficult than in Mix-1. As the grouping function is dependent on v j,i for j = 1, 2, . . . m and i = 1, 2, . . . n, if at least one server is honest to generate them randomly, the grouping on any server is random. So if only static attack (all colluding users and servers are chosen before the attack starts) is considered and at least one server SV j is honest to choose v j,i for i = 1, 2, . . . n randomly, the probability that the colluding users are in the same group on any server is low. For example, even if SV 1 colludes with two users, they happen to fall in a same group with a probability 1/z. That means although attacks involving more than one user and the first few servers against correctness is still possible, they succeed with a low probability 1 . Like in Mix-1, the probability to tamper with an honest user's input successfully is negligible if DL is intractable. Therefore, correctness property is improved.
The computational cost to produce the proof is n(4k − 2) exponentiations. The computational cost to verify the proof is 4nk exponentiations. Better efficiency is achieved compared to Mix-1.
Privacy of Mix-2 is achieved if the number of malicious decrypting authorities is no more than t. The extent of privacy is measured by two factors: diffusion of any single input and diffusion of the inputs as a whole. As stated before, in normal applications m < u. So, if a dishonest server reveals its shuffling, it makes no difference to the situation where this server performs re-encryption without permutation. Therefore, the only impact of this attack on the privacy of the shuffling of the whole mix network is to degrade the mix network to a mix network containing one fewer servers. The shuffling of the other servers is not affected and can still provide strong privacy protection.
-Diffusion of any single input: each input may be permuted to any of a set of k outputs with an equal probability, where is the number of honest servers. -Diffusion of the inputs as a whole: (k!) z possible permutations from the inputs of the mix network to its outputs are equally likely.
If m ≥ u, greater privacy is possible.
-When = u, diffusion of single input may be as great as that in Mix-1 (any input to n equally likely outputs). -When > u, diffusion of the inputs as a whole may be as great as that in
Mix-1 (all n! possible permutations are equally likely).
However, it is only possible as it depends on the distribution of the honest servers.
Batched Group-Shuffling Mix Network
Efficiency of correctness verification of Mix-2 is better compared to that of Mix-1. However it is still costly when n is large. The batch verification technique in Section 3.2 can be employed to improve the efficiency further. If every server SV j uses a same permutation π j to replace π j,α for α = 1, 2, . . . , z, according to Theorem 2 verification equation (5) can be batched as follows. To apply equation (6), the construction of the mix network must be changed slightly as follows. After the shuffling of all the servers, the outputs of the mix network are decrypted. Every decrypted message M i for i = 1, 2, . . . , n is checked to be in G by testing whether
Analysis

Correctness Analysis
Correctness of Mix-3 is proved in this subsection. 1,β , c j,2,β , . . . , c j,z,β ) for β = 1, 2, . . . , k where c j,α,β = (a j,α,β , b j 
Definition 4 Inputs of SV
j are divided into k vectors V β = (c j,,α,β ) is in (Z * p ) 2 . Outputs of SV j are divided into k vectors V β = (c j,1,β , c j,2,β , . . . , c j,z,β ) for β = 1, 2, . . . , k where c j,α,β = (a j,α,β , b j,α,β ) is in (Z * p ) 2 . Definition 5 SV j (V µ , V ν ) = 1 means SV j knows r α satisfying |a j,α,ν | = g rα |a j,α,µ | and |b j,α,ν | = y rα |b j,α,µ | for α = 1, 2, . . . , z.
Lemma 3. If the shuffling by SV j in Mix-3 is incorrect and for every
Proof of Lemma 3 is very similar to that of Lemma 1, so is left to the reader. 
Lemma 4. y
) are known where log g |y v | is not known and
Since t v −t v is public, log g |y v | is known. A contradiction is found, which means the statement is correct. So for every definite set {t i | t i < 2 l , i = 1, 2, . . . , n}, the probability that t v happens to be the unique possible value, so that log g Proof: The following denotations are used. C denotes the shuffling is correct.
As supposed, SV j cannot get collusion of all the previous j − 1 servers and at least 2z users with their re-encrypted inputs as c j,α,ρ and c j,α,δ for α = 1, 2, . . . , z where 1 ≤ ρ < δ ≤ k. So for any log g a j,α,ρ and log g a j,α,δ for α = 1, 2, . . . , z where 1 ≤ ρ < δ ≤ k, SV j knows at most 2z − 1 of them and the left one is independent of these 2z − 1 values in the viewpoint of SV j if DL problem is intractable. According to Lemma 3, if the shuffling by server SV j is incorrect and DL problem is intractable, there exists a vector V µ and no V ν with 1 ≤ ν ≤ k can satisfy SV j (V µ , V ν ) = 1, where vector V µ = (c j,1,µ , c j,2,µ , . . . , c j−1,z,µ ) and V ν = (c j,1,ν , c j,2,ν , . . . , c j,z,ν ) . Otherwise, SV j knows log g a j−1,α,i −log g a j−1,α,i for α = 1, 2, . . . , z where 1 ≤ i < i ≤ k, which is contradictory to the fact that for any log g a j,α,ρ and log g a j,α,δ for α = 1, 2, . . . , z where 1 ≤ ρ < δ ≤ k SV j knows at most 2z − 1 of them and the left one is independent of those 2z − 1 values in the viewpoint of SV j .
SV j (V µ , V ν ) = 1 means there exists α, such that 1 ≤ α ≤ k and N 1 µ ∨ N 2 µ is true. Namely, P (N 1 µ /C) + P (N 2 µ /C) = 1.
According to Theorem 2,
known to SV j with a probability no more than 2
According to Theorem 4, Mix-3 can provide correctness on every server with an overwhelmingly large probability if DL problem is intractable and on a condition that this server cannot obtain the collusion of all the previous j −1 servers and users with at least 2 inputs in each group on two same positions. This condition is much weaker than the conditions for correctness in Mix-1 and Mix-2 as even though collusion of 2z or more users is available, the probability of their inputs are in each group on two same positions is very small if at least one server SV j is honest to choose v j,i for i = 1, 2, . . . n randomly. Like in Mix-1 and Mix-2, the probability to tamper with an honest user's input is negligible. If the shuffling on every server is correct, the plaintexts in the inputs to the mix network {m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n } and its plaintext outputs
performed to obtain correct outputs. Therefore, stronger correctness is achieved in Mix-3 than in Mix-1 and Mix-2 as less trust on the users is needed in Mix-3.
Other Properties
Shuffling by every server can be verified publicly and efficiently and a cheating server can be identified immediately. Any identified cheating server is deleted and its inputs become inputs to the next server. So abnormal situations can be dealt with efficiently and the proposed scheme is robust.
Recall that as defined in Section 1 and Section 4 there are n users and m servers in the mix network; the number of honest servers is ; t-out-of-m threshold distributed decryption is used; k is the size of a group, z is the number of groups and k u = n. The computational cost for correctness proof and verification on a server in Mix-3 are k(4k − 2) and 4k 2 exponentiations respectively. These costs are independent of the number of inputs and more efficient than those in Mix-2. Groth [10] not specified 1 among n n! permutations Yes Privacy of Mix-3 is achieved if the number of malicious decrypting authorities is no more than t. Extent of privacy in Mix-3 is as follows when m < u is assumed.
-Diffusion of any single input in Mix-3 is the same as that in Mix-2 (each input may be permuted to any of k outputs with an equal probability). -Diffusion of the inputs as a whole in Mix-3 is weaker: (k!) possible permutation from the inputs of the mix network to its outputs are equally likely.
So, stronger correctness and higher efficiency in Mix-3 compared to in Mix-2 is achieved by sacrificing some privacy. By selecting appropriate k and m, a good trade-off between efficiency and privacy can be achieved. When m ≥ u, as in the case of Mix-2, privacy may be improved in both factors if the distribution of honest servers is appropriate. In Table 1 and Table 2 , the proposed scheme is compared against the best mix networks in the third category (defined in Section 2). Note the following points -"not specified" in Table 1 means the probability of correctness (with how much a probability the mix network is correct)is not provided. -In [1] only t + 1 out of the m servers take part in the shuffling.
-Re-encryption on each server cost 4(n log 2 n − n + 1) exponentiations in [1] if ElGamal encryption is employed, while in other shuffling schemes this cost is usually 2n. That is another aspect of inefficiency in [1] . -In [14] , it was declared that the total computational cost of proof and verification of shuffling correctness is 8k + 5. However, the shuffling scheme in [14] is not concrete and it is commonly believed that Neff's scheme is not so efficient as he claimed. Like Groth's analysis in [10] , in this paper it is concluded that Neff's shuffling scheme costs ςn exponentiations (where ς is a small integer) and is not as efficient as [8] or [10] .
In [1] only t+1 out of the m servers take part in the shuffling. The final version of the proposed scheme, Mix-3, achieves correctness more clearly (with a concrete extent) than the other schemes. Suppose in the proposed scheme, the decrypting authorities are chosen from the shuffling servers and the decryption key is shared among them with a t-out-of-m threshold like in most other mix networks. Then, when ≤ t, there is no privacy in either Abe's schemes [1, 2] or the proposed scheme as the inputs can be decrypted by t + 1 malicious servers. When > t, privacy in Mix-3 is sufficient for most applications although dependent on it may not achieve the maximum privacy as in [1] . The proposed scheme is more efficient than all the other schemes, especially when n is large. Moreover, the proposed scheme is simpler than Abe's schemes as complex gate circuit is not employed and the achieved properties are not dependent on theorems in gate circuit theory.
Correctness proof on a server Correctness verification on a server Abe [1] 12(n log 2 n − n + 1) 16(n log 2 n − n + 1) Furukawa [8] 8n 10n Neff [14] o(n) o(n) Groth [10] a 6n + 3n/κ + 3 6n + 3n/κ + 6 Mix-3 k(4k − 2) 4k 2 a κ is a parameter smaller than n. Table 2 . Comparison of computation cost in full-length exponentiations
In Table 3 , an example is given to make a clearer comparison where |q| = 1024, n = 10000, m = 5, t = 2, k = 10, = 4 > t, κ = 100 and SV 5 is assumed to be dishonest. Note that computational cost in Table 3 is in full-length exponentiations while some multiplications and short-length exponentiations are ignored as they are trivial compared to the costs of the full-length exponentiations . The results of this table clearly demonstrate enormous improvement on efficiency in the proposed scheme without losing strong correctness and privacy when there are a large number of users. In a national wide election involving millions of voters, the efficiency advantage of the proposed scheme is greater.
Conclusion
The proposed mix network provides strong and precise correctness and privacy. With the help of a grouping function and a batch verification technique, the mix network is very efficient. The mix network is robust and can deal with dishonest servers efficiently.
